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Studying aversive behaviour is critical for understanding negative emotions and associated psy-
chopathologies. However a comprehensive picture of the mechanisms underlying aversion is lacking,
with associative learning theories focusing on Pavlovian reactions and decision-making theoretic
approaches on prospective functions. We propose a computational model of aversion that combines
goal-directed and Pavlovian forms of control into a unifying framework in which their relative impor-
tance is regulated by factors such as threat distance and controllability. Using simulations, we test
whether the model can reproduce available empirical findings and discuss its relevance to understanding
factors underlying negative emotions such as fear and anxiety. Furthermore, the specific method used to
construct the model permits a natural mapping from its components to brain structure and function. Our
model provides a basis for a unifying account of aversion that can guide empirical and interventional
study contexts.
 2015 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. This is an open access articleunder the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Given their fundamental importance in evolution, the strategies
adopted by living organisms to manage danger have been exten-
sively studied. Early associative-learning theorists proposed that
aversive behaviour is guided by simple instrumental principles
prescribing that punishment diminishes the probability of per-
forming an action while avoidance of, and relief from, punishment
reinforces the probability of performing a similar action
(Dinsmoor, 2001; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967; Solomon & Brush,
1956; Thorndike, 1911). Bolles (1970) criticised this framework
arguing it was based on a wrong assumption that all actions in
the animal’s repertoire have the same prior chance of being
selected and instead argued that there are species-specific defen-
sive reactions, selected by evolution, which are preferentially acti-
vated and replaced by other responses only after repeated
punishments. This derived from particular observations, for exam-
ple the fact that rats usually exhibit a specific freezing response to
fearful stimuli and can learn only a small set of responses to avoid
punishment, with each response requiring a certain amount of
learning experience (Bolles, 1970).More recent findings argue even more strongly against a central
role for instrumental learning as they show that in some cases
repeated experience of electric shock increases (rather than dimin-
ishing) the probability of performing a pre-specified response such
as freezing (Fanselow & Lester, 1988). These data highlight the
existence of a set of innate (i.e., Pavlovian) aversive reactions eli-
cited by certain conditions of shock temporal delay, as rats froze
immediately after the presentation of a conditioned stimulus,
while just before and after a shock they exhibited a fight/flight
reaction consistent in jumping, biting and vocalizing (Fendt &
Fanselow, 1999). A similar response pattern was observed when
manipulating the spatial, instead of temporal, threat distance,
together with the observation that rats engage in cautious explo-
ration (described as risk-assessment behaviour) when a threat is
not actually present but is potential, such as in a novel context
or where a predator has been previously seen (Blanchard &
Blanchard, 1989).
Another important modulator of aversive behaviour is control-
lability. In a classic experiment on learned helplessness (Seligman
& Maier, 1967), one group of dogs learnt to press a lever to termi-
nate non-signalled electric shocks whereas a second group
received shocks exactly contemporaneously to the first group but
had no actual control on shock delivery, a procedure ensuring pun-
ishment was matched in terms of number, intensity and time
across groups. After the learning phase, the two groups were tested
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to avoid shocks. Here the dogs trained with controllable punish-
ments learnt the instrumental safety response whereas the other
group failed to learn this response. The finding is widely inter-
preted as indicative of a generalisation of uncontrollability beliefs
from one context to the other (Maier & Seligman, 1976) or, alterna-
tively, as due to the fact that uncontrollable punishments increase
stereotypical fear responses (e.g., freezing) which interfere with
the performance of alternative actions (Desiderato & Newman,
1971; Mineka, Cook, & Miller, 1984).
Altogether, associative learning theories view aversive beha-
viour as determined by a set of stimulus–response associations,
either shaped by experience (i.e., instrumental) or innate (i.e.,
Pavlovian), and modulated by temporal/spatial threat distance
and controllability. A striking example of Pavlovian–instrumental
interaction is negative auto-maintenance (Williams & Williams,
1969), in which pigeons trained with a light-food association exhi-
bit a conditioned response of pecking the light even when, in a test
phase, food is delivered solely as a consequence of non-responding.
These and similar findings represent the building blocks of the idea
that flexible instrumental mechanisms are activated together with
rigid Pavlovian tendencies that usually facilitate performance but,
given their rigidity, in some circumstances have maladaptive con-
sequences (Dayan, Niv, Seymour, & Daw, 2006; Guitart-Masip,
Duzel, Dolan, & Dayan, 2014; Moutoussis, Bentall, Williams, &
Dayan, 2008; Rigoli, Pavone, & Pezzulo, 2012). However, several
fundamental theoretical aspects remain to be clarified. First, in
which conditions are instrumental rather than Pavlovian responses
elicited? Second, what is the specific role of threat distance and
controllability in modulating aversive behaviour? Third, dating
back to Tolman’s notion of latent learning (1932), research in the
appetitive domain has investigated a form of instrumental beha-
viour guided by goal-directed processes which are based on
stimulus-action-outcome associations, but the part played by
these mechanisms in the aversive domain remains unclear
(Balleine & Dickinson, 1998; Dickinson & Balleine, 1994).
Here, we connect associative learning theories of aversion and
theoretical models of the instrumental–Pavlovian interaction with
a specific focus on goal-directed mechanisms. We propose that
threat distance and perceived controllability modulate a goal-
directed/Pavlovian relationship by increasing the weight one con-
troller exerts over the other. Specifically, we argue that proximal
threat distance and low controllability boost a Pavlovian weight,
based on observations of increased freezing and fight/flight
response (hallmarks of Pavlovian control) in this condition. Con-
versely, larger threat distance and higher controllability boost
goal-directed mechanisms, a process we interpret as underlying
risk-assessment behaviour observed in rodents under potential
threats. We formalise these intuitions in a biologically plausible
computational model and then test whether this model can repro-
duce reported empirical data.
2. A model of the goal-directed/Pavlovian interaction in
aversion
We introduce a theoretical model whose aim is to describe the
computational processes underlying the expression of aversive
behaviour. We highlight a link to a set of neural network models
that combine reinforcement learning principles within a biologi-
cally plausible implementation (e.g., Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly,
2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Reynolds & O’Reilly, 2009). An advan-
tage of this model is that it can be linked to neurobiology given
that each component is mapped to a specific neural structure or
set of structures. The model rests on a distinction between goal-
directed and Pavlovian control (Balleine & Dickinson, 1998;Dayan et al., 2006; Guitart-Masip et al., 2014; Rigoli et al., 2012),
where each system uses a specific algorithm to compute an esti-
mate of the expected value linked to a given context. The Pavlovian
controller learns to associate expected values directly with stimuli,
depending on stimulus-punishment contingencies, whereas the
goal-directed controller learns to associate expected values with
stimulus-action-outcome associations. Eventually each controller
selects an action. For a given stimulus, the Pavlovian controller
always chooses the same innate reaction, whereas the goal-
directed system can flexibly choose different actions according to
a softmax rule (Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006).
Finally, the innate Pavlovian response and the action selected by
the goal-directed controller are activated proportionally to the
weight of the corresponding controller, and these actions cooper-
ate or compete depending on their compatibility. Threat distance
and perceived controllability are the key variables that modulate
the engagement of a controller. The influence of threat distance
is represented as a boosting effect on goal-directed activation as
a function of increasing distance. The role of perceived controllabil-
ity is more complex as this variable is factorized into two subcom-
ponents, the first dependent on controllability related to a specific
stimulus and the second on a generalised belief independent of
stimuli.
More specifically (see Appendix A and Fig. 1), the model
describes an agent’s computations during aversive conditions as
emergent from different subsystems organised in layers each com-
posed of different nodes. An input from the environment is repre-
sented as the activation of a specific node in a Perceptive layer
(PERC). PERC activates a goal-directed subsystem composed of dif-
ferent layers, namely Action (ACT), Expected Outcome (OUT),
Expected Goal-directed Value (GDV), Working Memory (WM)
and Goal-directed Plan (GDP). ACT, representing the current simu-
lated action during planning, encodes each action as activation of a
specific node. PERC and ACT are connected to OUT, which repre-
sents likely future states of the world in which each node repre-
sents an expected outcome. A given combination of PERC and
ACT activity corresponds to a specific input to OUT. Each OUT node
activity, computed as the input value divided by the sum of all
other inputs to OUT, can be conceived as the conditional probabil-
ity of the corresponding expected outcome, given PERC and ACT
activity. All OUT nodes are connected to GDV, which is computed
as the sum of OUT node activities, each node multiplied by its
expected value (encoded by the OUT–GDV connection weights).
Once this value is computed, it is stored in WM which records
the different action values.
The goal-directed subsystem follows a cyclic dynamic through
which, once PERC is activated, an action simulation process is eli-
cited consisting in sequential activation of different ACT nodes,
and in the evaluation (encoded in GDV) of their likely conse-
quences (encoded in OUT). More specifically, when a stimulus is
presented, the first action in the repertoire is activated in ACT
and this activates OUT and in turn GDV. WM encodes the expected
value of the first action (corresponding to the activation of the first
GDV node) and, through a recursive connection to ACT, inhibits the
activation of the ACT node corresponding to the first action, elicit-
ing activation of the second-action ACT node. Therefore, a new OUT
and GDV activations are computed and the latter recorded in WM.
When all actions have been simulated and the corresponding
expected values recorded in WM, the goal-directed subsystem
makes a choice. In keeping with human evidence (Daw,
O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, & Dolan, 2006), action is chosen
according to a softmax rule and the chosen action is coded as acti-
vation of a specific GDP node. The activated GDP node acquires the
activation level of the higher activation WM node, even if the two
nodes do not correspond to the same action.
Fig. 1. Architecture of the computational model. Coloured boxes indicate the subsystems (green: perceptive subsystem, red: goal-directed subsystem, yellow: Pavlovian
subsystem, blue: modulatory subsystem) and black boxes represent the computational layers. Arrows indicate the connections among layers. PERC: perception; ACT: action;
OUT: outcome; WM: working memory; GDV: goal-directed value; GDP: goal-directed plan; TSTD: temporal and spatial threat distance; SC: specific controllability; GC:
general controllability; PV: Pavlovian value; PR: Pavlovian response; IA: instrumental ability.
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one-step temporal horizon. Though in simulations we focus on this
special case (see below), the model can be extended to more dis-
tant temporal horizons. However, in this case the goal-directed
subsystem needs to evaluate policies, namely sequences of actions,
rather than single actions alone. This is achieved by adding a num-
ber of ACT, OUT and GDV layers equal to the number of time steps
the agent plans ahead, plus a policy (POL) and a GDV-SUM layer.
Goal-directed planning works again in a recursive manner starting
with activation of the first node of POL, which in turns switches on
a specific combination of nodes within the different ACT layers
along time. As before, activity in the first (in temporal order) ACT
and in PERC results in a specific activation in the first OUT (in
which each input is divided by the sum of all other inputs) and
GDV. In a cascade process, activation in the first OUT and second
ACT propagates to the second OUT up to the second GDV and so
forth. Activations of all GDVs along time are summed up in GDV-
SUM (note that a discount parameter can be implemented at this
stage) and stored in WM, which, thanks to the same mechanism
described above, inhibits the first POL node and activates the sec-
ond POL node, for which the process is repeated. Eventually, all
policies are simulated and the corresponding expected values are
encoded within WM.
In parallel with recruiting the goal-directed system, PERC also
triggers the Pavlovian subsystem, composed of a Pavlovian
expected Value (PV) and Pavlovian Reaction (PR) layers. Every
stimulus is associated with a specific PV activation, depending on
the weights of the PERC–PV connection. In turn, PV activates PR
that represents the innate conditioned or unconditioned motorresponse triggered by PERC and whose activation is proportional
to PV.
PERC is also connected to a modulator subsystem representing
controllability and threat distance. The former is implemented
through two layers, namely Specific Controllability (SC) and Gener-
alised Controllability (GC), and the latter corresponds to the Tem-
poral and Spatial Threat Distance (TSTD) layer. For the
implementation of controllability, we follow learned helplessness
theory (Maier & Seligman, 1976) maintaining that the controllabil-
ity associated with a specific context corresponds to the condi-
tional probability of avoiding a punishment with the best action,
minus the probability of avoiding the punishment without that
action, multiplied by the value of that punishment. The first com-
ponent (SC) represents controllability relative to a given context
and simply corresponds to the difference between the maximum
andminimum action values within theWM layer. The second com-
ponent (GC) represents a more abstract variable which depends on
past controllability experience independent of context. After each
new trial, GC is updated according to a delta rule based on the
SC value at that trial and independent of which stimulus is present.
We hypothesise that GC is important to model learned helpless-
ness effects by which animals, after repeated uncontrollable pun-
ishments, cannot learn an appropriate instrumental action in a
novel context, an effect that could arise out of an uncontrollability
bias developed after repeated experience (Huys & Dayan, 2009).
Finally, in relation to threat distance, the corresponding TSTD acti-
vation corresponds to the time or space to the threat.
The different subsystems determine the behavioural output of
the model as their activities are summed up in the so-called
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goal-directed system. In particular, IA is positively correlated with
GDP, SC, PR, GC and TSTD. Finally, a motor output (BEHAVIOUR) is
computed based on a logistic regression of IA. The probability that
BEHAVIOUR corresponds to GDP or PR is directly and inversely
proportional to IA respectively.
So far, we have described the model structure and its decision
processes. We now explain the model’s learning mechanisms. Once
BEHAVIOUR is executed, an outcome (OUTCOME) is obtained in the
environment and is used for learning. The weight of the PERC–
ACT–OUT connection is updated based on Hebbian rules, in other
words the link between the active PERC node, the ACT node corre-
sponding to BEHAVIOUR, and the OUT node corresponding to OUT-
COME is strengthened at each new experience. The connection
between the OUT node corresponding to OUTCOME and GDV is
modified following a temporal difference algorithm (Sutton &
Barto, 1998) as well as the connection between the active PERC
node and PV. GC is updated following a delta rule based on the
value of SC in a given trial.3. Simulations
A specific version of the model was implemented in simulation
experiments representing a scenario (Fig. 2A) wherein a simulated
rat is presented with a chain and a lever. At every trial either a red
or black visual cue appears followed, after few seconds, either by a
high or low auditory tone. Here the high and low tones are associ-
ated respectively with delivery and omission of an electric shock
stimulus with a negative value of one unit. In the time interval
between the presentation of the visual cue and the tone, the rat
is allowed to press the lever, pull the chain or do nothing. The
action selected influences which auditory tone (either high or
low) is presented and therefore whether punishment is delivered
or not. At every trial, the most advantageous action depends on
which visual cue is shown and hence, to minimise punishment,Fig. 2. (A) Task used in simulations, in which for each trial a simulated rat is presented e
low tone and no shock, depending on the rat’s action. (B) Action value as computed by th
green: doing nothing) and Pavlovian value (PV in red) associated with the red cue (here
which the Pavlovian system is not allowed to influence behaviour. (C) Action value as co
cue (here CP avoids shock 20% of the times, other actions never avoid shock) in the first sim
actions never avoid shock) and black cue (here CP avoids shock 20% of the times, other a
allowed to influence behaviour. (E) Action value as computed by the goal-directed system
are as in B. (F) Action value as computed by the goal-directed system and Pavlovian valthe rat has to learn the best action to perform with each visual
cue (see below for contingencies used in simulations).
In relation to specific characteristics of the model used in sim-
ulations, PERC has two nodes, associated with the ‘red’ and ‘black’
visual cue, respectively. ACT has three nodes, associated with ‘lever
pressing’, ‘chain pulling’, and ‘no action’, respectively. OUT has two
nodes, associated with the ‘high’ and ‘low’ auditory tone, respec-
tively. WM, GDP, PR and BEHAVIOUR have three nodes each, asso-
ciated with the same actions as ACT, whereas GDV, PV, SC, GC and
TSTD have one node each. In order to describe and test key charac-
teristics of the model, we used five simulation experiments
described in detail below.
3.1. Goal-directed control
The aim of the first simulation is to test the model’s ability to
use goal-directed control to learn the correct actions in relation
to different contexts. Task contingencies are as follows: when a
red cue appears, lever pressing leads to a low tone and shock is
always avoided while all other actions, namely chain pulling and
doing nothing, lead to a high tone and shock. In the case where a
black cue appears, chain pulling is better as shock is avoided 20%
of times while it is always delivered by lever pressing or doing
nothing. Here we test whether the goal-directed system can learn
the correct actions associated with each of the two cues. In this
simulation the goal-directed system alone is allowed to affect
behaviour. Since goal-directed and Pavlovian processes are to some
degree always co-activated in ecological circumstances, this condi-
tion is unrealistic; however, here we discuss it in order to better
clarify how the goal-directed component works.
Data shown in Fig. 2B and C describe the value associated with
each of the three actions. Pavlovian values associated to stimuli are
also presented, although in this simulation by design they are not
allowed to impact on behaviour. Results indicate that the agent is
able to learn the correct policy both with the red (Fig. 2B) and black
(Fig. 2C) cue. However, the asymptotic value related to the bestither a red or black visual cue followed either by a high auditory tone and shock or
e goal-directed system (LP in blue: lever pressing; CP in cyan: chain pulling; DN in
LP always avoids shock, other actions never avoid shock) in the first simulation, in
mputed by the goal-directed system and Pavlovian value associated with the black
ulation. (D) Instrumental ability (IA) for the red (here LP always avoids shock, other
ctions never avoid shock) in the second simulation in which the Pavlovian system is
and Pavlovian value associated with the red cue in the second simulation. Colours
ue associated with the black cue in the second simulation. Colours are as in B.
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tent with the concept that asymptotic values represent the
expected value of actions (Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944).
Also, the asymptotic Pavlovian value is higher (i.e., less negative)
with the red than the black cue, consistent with the fact that the
Pavlovian value of each stimulus is proportional to the probability
of punishment associated with that stimulus and is independent
from the action performed. In relation to learning, the goal-
directed subsystem learns two kinds of information, namely the
causal associations between stimuli, actions, and outcomes and
the outcome-value associations. Overall, these results show that
the goal-directed subsystem can learn and choose consistent with
models of prospective decision-making (Glimcher, 2004; Glimcher
& Rustichini, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
3.2. Goal-directed/Pavlovian interaction
The aim of the second simulation is to analyse the relationship
between Pavlovian and goal-directed mechanisms. Here, when a
red cue is presented, lever pressing always avoids shock and shock
is always delivered with other actions. When a black cue is pre-
sented, chain pulling leads to shock avoidance 20% of times and
shock is always delivered with other actions. Contrary to the pre-
vious simulation, in this instance both goal-directed and Pavlovian
subsystems are allowed to influence behaviour. In this and follow-
ing simulations, the response triggered by the Pavlovian system is
always ‘doing nothing’ to simulate a freezing response, and is never
adaptive as it always leads to shock.
Results are reported in Fig. 2D and F showing the probability of
the goal-directed system in the control of behaviour in front of the
red (red line) and the black (black line) cues. At the beginning,
behaviour is completely goal-directed in both contexts. Contingen-
cies are unknown and hence actions are chosen randomly, leading
often to shock and thus to a more negative Pavlovian value. How-
ever, at the same time knowledge about stimulus-action-outcome-
value associations improves with learning and therefore with the
red cue an effective action (i.e., lever pressing) is acquired leading
to an increased Pavlovian value (Fig. 2D and E). By contrast, with
the black cue the best action still leads to shock most of the times
(although less than other actions) and therefore the Pavlovian
value continues to decrease triggering an innate tendency to freez-
ing corresponding to ‘do nothing’. Although this response is mal-
adaptive, nonetheless it is maintained by a vicious circle
whereby a negative Pavlovian value triggers a Pavlovian response
followed by punishment that in turn decreases further the Pavlo-
vian value.
These results are consistent with animal experiments showing
that in some circumstances Pavlovian effects are detrimental for
performance (Bolles, 1970; Guitart-Masip et al., 2014; Rigoli
et al., 2012; Williams &Williams, 1969). Note that a key prediction
stemming from this simulation is that the influence of Pavlovian
over goal-directed control increases with the level of punishment
expected, and this is consistent with empirical evidence.
Fanselow and Bolles (1979) have shown that the probability of
freezing correlates with punishment intensity, suggesting an
enhanced Pavlovian strength with large punishment expectancy.
However, a limit of this experiment is the lack of instrumental
components. This limitation is addressed in another study (Bolles
& Warren, 1965) showing that the probability of bar pressing to
avoid shock decreases with shock intensity, suggesting that goal-
directed behaviour (associated with bar pressing) is dominated
by Pavlovian control with large punishment expectancy. This result
is also consistent with a recent human study (Rigoli et al., 2012)
where a stimulus moved on a computer screen and a button
needed to be pressed when the stimulus was on a target. The col-
our of the target indicated whether an electric shock was deliveredor not with a mistake and, in different trials, the stimulus could
move fast or slow. For the fast condition, performance decreased
when comparing shock versus no-shock trials. Crucially, this effect
was enhanced in participants with poorer task performance, con-
sistent with the idea that the Pavlovian influence dominated
goal-directed behaviour in participants who expected more
punishment (given their poor performance).
3.3. Modulatory role of specific controllability
We next explore effects of controllability related to specific con-
texts. Here the red cue leads to shock avoidance 20% of times inde-
pendently of the action performed and the black cue leads to shock
avoidance 20% of times with chain pulling and never with other
actions. In this way, the red cue is associated with low controllabil-
ity as no action is better than others, while the black cue is associ-
ated with a certain degree of controllability as one action is better
than others. Crucially, the shock probability is equivalent with the
red and black cues (in the latter case conditioned on the execution
of the correct action). Here, we predict that different degrees
of specific controllability influence the balance between goal-
directed and Pavlovian activation.
Fig. 3A shows that the probability that behaviour is goal-
directed and the value of SC are asymptotically higher for the black
than the red cue. Also, Fig. 3B and C shows that with the red cue
action values remain roughly equal along trials, while with the
black cue the value of the best action remains higher. These results
show how the model implements a modulatory influence of speci-
fic controllability on the relative strength of goal-directed and
Pavlovian control, as Pavlovian strength is inhibited when a given
action is better than others (corresponding to higher controllabil-
ity) and is boosted when action values are roughly equivalent (cor-
responding to lower controllability).
This is consistent with animal findings showing fear responses
increase with uncontrollable, compared to controllable, shocks;
even when punishment amount is equivalent in the two conditions
(Desiderato & Newman, 1971; Mineka et al., 1984). However, some
aspects of the simulation proposed here represent novel predic-
tions that go beyond the available empirical data, and remain to
be tested. Indeed, Mineka et al. (1984; see also Desiderato &
Newman, 1971) trained two groups of rats with shock. While the
first group could terminate shocks with an escape response, the
second group received shock at the same time as the first group
but could not affect punishment delivery. When exposed to the
context where learning occurred, the second group of rats exhib-
ited increased freezing. This experiment shows that Pavlovian
responding is boosted by uncontrollable punishment, but leaves
open the question of whether this impairs goal-directed behaviour,
as we suggest in our simulation. In addition, previous experiments
(Desiderato & Newman, 1971; Mineka et al., 1984) are in the con-
text of shock escaping. Though our model makes similar predic-
tions for both escape and avoidance contexts, these predictions
remain to be empirically tested in avoidance.
3.4. Modulatory role of generalised controllability
In the model, controllability is factorized into two subcompo-
nents, specific and generalised controllability. Specific controllabil-
ity depends on the conditional probabilities of avoiding a
punishment by acting in a given context while generalised control-
lability depends on the probability of avoiding punishments by act-
ing independent from contexts. Here we test the role of generalised
controllability, and whether manipulating this variable allows us
to reproduce key empirical findings on learned helplessness.
We consider the same scenario as in previous simulations but
now we group trials in two blocks. In all trials of the first block a
Fig. 3. (A) Instrumental ability (IA) for the red (red line) and black (black line) cue and associated specific controllability (SC; orange line for red cue and grey line for black
cue) in the third simulation. With the red cue, all actions avoid shock 20% of the time; with the black cue chain pulling avoids shock 20% of the time and other actions never
avoid shock. (B) Action value as computed by the goal-directed system with the red cue in the third simulation (LP in blue: lever pressing; CP in cyan: chain pulling; DN in
green: doing nothing). (C) Action value as computed by the goal-directed system with the black cue in the third simulation. (D) IA (in red), SC (in green) and general
controllability (GC, in blue) for the first agent during simulation four (in trials 1–500, the red square was shown and shock occurred 90% of the times independently of the
response; in trials 501–1000 the black square was shown and shock was avoided 90% of the times with chain pulling and always delivered with other actions). The grey bar
represents the trial corresponding to the shift from red to black cue presentation. (E) IA, SC and GC (same colour as in D) for the second agent during simulation four (in trials
1–7000, the red square was shown and shock occurred 90% of the times independently of the response; in trials 7001–7500 the black square was shown and shock was
avoided 90% of the times with chain pulling and always delivered with other actions). The grey bar represents the trial corresponding to the shift from red to black cue
presentation. (F) IA for the red cue and 30 s delay from shock (red line), the red cue and 3 s delay from shock (orange line), the black cue and 30 s delay from shock (black line),
and the black cue and 3 s delay from shock (grey line). For the red cue, lever pressing is followed by shock 20% of the times and shock is always delivered with other actions;
for the black cue, chain pulling is followed by shock 40% of the times and shock is always delivered with other actions.
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dent of the action performed. In all trials of the second block a black
cue is presented and shock is avoided 90% of times with chain pull-
ing and 10% of times with other actions. We manipulated the
amount of learning by comparing the performance of two agents
characterised by the same parameters but experiencing a different
number of trials in the first context (500 and 7000 trials for the first
and second agent respectively). This is motivated by evidence indi-
cating that learned helplessness effects emerge only after extensive
experience in an uncontrollable environment (Seligman & Maier,
1967). Consistent with these findings, we expect the amount of
learning in the uncontrollable context to influence the level of gen-
eralised controllability and in turn determine whether learned
helplessness behaviour is exhibited in a novel context.
Agents’ performance is shown in Fig. 3D and E. In the first block,
goal-directed strength and specific and generalised controllability
decay for both agents, but generalised controllability decays more
for the agent with extensive training. With a novel context, all
quantities are reset except for generalised controllability so that
the level of this variable remains high enough to elicit goal-
directed control for the short-trained agent but not for the long-
trained agent in which Pavlovian control is elicited also in the
novel context. This manipulation reproduces data on learned help-
lessness showing that animals, after an extensive experience of
uncontrollability, are unable to learn an effective instrumental
response even in novel contexts that are potentially controllable
(Maier & Seligman, 1976; Seligman & Maier, 1967).
3.5. Modulatory role of temporal and spatial threat distance
Temporal and spatial distance constitutes the other modulatory
variable implemented in the model. We now test whether manip-
ulating this variable influences behaviour. With the red cue shock
is always avoided by lever pressing and never avoided with other
actions. For the black cue shock is avoided 60% of times by chainpulling and never avoided with other actions. The time interval
between the cue presentation and shock delivery randomly varies
on two levels (3 and 30 s) across trials and is signalled during stim-
ulus presentation. We expect that with the black cue (associated to
higher goal-directed and Pavlovian values) behaviour is largely
under goal-directed control though to a lesser extent when shock
delivery is close in time, while with the red cue (associated to
lower goal-directed and Pavlovian values) we expect goal-
directed control to guide behaviour when the threat is far in time
and Pavlovian control to guide behaviour when the threat is close
in time.
These predictions are confirmed by results shown in Fig. 3F that
is consistent with empirical evidence about the role of temporal
and spatial threat distance played in aversive behaviour
(Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989; Fanselow & Lester, 1988). Substan-
tial evidence indicates that the probability of freezing decreases
with shock delay (Fanselow & Lester, 1988). A similar role of threat
distance is found in spatial contexts where the probability of freez-
ing increases when a predator is close in space (Blanchard &
Blanchard, 1989). These studies demonstrate that the Pavlovian
strength, expressed by freezing behaviour, is boosted with short
temporal and spatial distance. However, one limit of these studies
is the lack of instrumental aspects, leaving open the question of
whether Pavlovian control dominates goal-directed behaviour as
threat distance diminishes. Evidence in favour of this hypothesis
comes from a recent human study (Rigoli et al., 2012) where the
impairing effect of a conditioned stimulus on instrumental beha-
viour emerged only in trials with a short temporal delay between
the conditioned stimulus and the punishment.4. Implications for neurobiology
Here we propose a connection between our model and neurobi-
ology. In general, our implementation is consistent with the
F. Rigoli et al. / Cognition 146 (2016) 415–425 421proposal that the aversive system is organised hierarchically in the
brain along a rostro-caudal axis where different regions are prefer-
entially recruited by specific levels of threat distance and are asso-
ciated with distinct defensive reactions (Bravo-Rivera, Roman-
Ortiz, Brignoni-Perez, Sotres-Bayon, & Quirk, 2014; Deakin &
Graeff, 1991; Fanselow, 1994; McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Evidence
shows that distal or potential threats recruit preferentially rostral
areas such as dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), orbitofrontal
cortex (OFC), hippocampus and ventromedial prefrontal cortex
(vmPFC), whereas amygdala and periaqueductal grey (PAG) play
a central role in processing proximal threats (Blanchard &
Blanchard, 1989; Deakin & Graeff, 1991; Fanselow, 1994; Graeff,
2004; Keay & Bandler, 2001, 2002; McNaughton & Corr, 2004).
Our model connects the neural hierarchy to the distinction
between goal-directed and Pavlovian forms of control.
More specifically, each subsystem in the model can be mapped
to a specific brain circuit, with PERC implemented in sensory cor-
tical and subcortical areas and ACT related to regions involved in
(abstract) motor representations such as the supplemental motor
area and the premotor cortex (Rizzolatti et al., 1988). A role in
ACT might be played also by the caudate nucleus and the putamen
of the basal ganglia (corresponding to the dorsolateral and dorso-
medial striatum in rodents, respectively), which are involved in
instrumental, but not Pavlovian, action selection (Pennartz, Ito,
Verschure, Battaglia, & Robbins, 2011; Yin, Ostlund, & Balleine,
2008). OUT, associated with mental simulation of future sensory
states, might recruit regions involved in processing abstract state
representations such as (i) the hippocampus, where cells encoding
the spatial position of an animal (the so-called place cells) sweep
forward at decision points and can code future trajectories when
the animal rests or sleeps, consistent with planning and the mental
simulation of possible future positions (Diba & Buzsáki, 2007;
Johnson & Redish, 2007; Pezzulo, Rigoli, & Chersi, 2013; Pezzulo,
van der Meer, Lansink, & Pennartz, 2014; Pfeiffer & Foster, 2013;
Wikenheiser & Redish, 2015), (ii) more broadly, the medio-
temporal lobe, a region involved in episodic memory and in repre-
senting abstract categories (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007; Squire,
Stark, & Clark, 2004). Based on evidence highlighting a role for
OFC in representing specifically outcome (but not action) value,
one possibility is that this region processes GDV, corresponding
to the value of future states (Schoenbaum, Takahashi, Liu, &
McDannald, 2011). Substantial evidence has indicated a central
role of DLPFC in executive functions, and specifically in working
memory, corresponding to WM in our model, and choice process,
corresponding to GDP (Gold & Shadlen, 2007; Koechlin &
Summerfield, 2007; Miller & Cohen, 2001; Stoianov, Genovesio, &
Pezzulo, 2015).
In relation with Pavlovian mechanisms, unconditioned fight/
flight reactions and non-opioid analgesia are regulated by lateral
PAG (lPAG) and hypothalamus (Keay & Bandler, 2001, 2002), and
conditioned freezing responses and opioid analgesia by ventro-
lateral PAG (vlPAG; Fanselow, 1994; Keay & Bandler, 2001, 2002).
In addition, amygdala plays a central role in storing Pavlovian rep-
resentations (Cardinal, Parkinson, Hall, & Everitt, 2002; Davis,
1992), with basolateral nuclei encoding conditioned-
unconditioned stimulus associations (Amorapanth, LeDoux, &
Nader, 2000; Choi, Cain, & LeDoux, 2010; Lázaro-Muñoz, LeDoux,
& Cain, 2010) and central extended nuclei controlling different
aspects of conditioned responses such as motor reactions, opioid-
mediated analgesia (through connections with vlPAG), hormonal
and autonomic reactions (through hypothalamic connections),
and vigilance associations (Amorapanth et al., 2000; Choi et al.,
2010; Lázaro-Muñoz et al., 2010). Another important role is played
by the ventral striatum of the basal ganglia, which processes Pavlo-
vian values associated with conditioned stimuli (Cardinal et al.,
2002; Yin et al., 2008).Evidence indicates that an increased response in the dorsal
raphé nuclei (DRN) elicits learned helplessness behaviour, while
activation in vmPFC inhibits such behaviour (Amat et al., 2005;
Maier & Watkins, 2005). A possibility is that GC, representing a
generalised belief about controllability, is reflected in the firing
rate of DRN neurons, while SC, indicating a controllability belief
related to the current context, might instead be processed in
vmPFC. This is consistent with the finding that vmPFC activity dur-
ing decision-making correlates with the value difference across
options (Boorman, Behrens, Woolrich, & Rushworth, 2009; Hunt
et al., 2012; Strait, Blanchard, & Hayden, 2014), a signal similar
to SC.
It has been reported that processing of emotional, compared to
neutral, stimuli recruits amygdala directly via thalamo, bypassing
the cortex (Vuilleumier & Driver, 2007). It is possible that such
neural pathway is modulated by the temporal and spatial threat
distance in such a way that it is preferentially recruited during per-
ception of proximal dangers. Another aspect relevant to threat dis-
tance is that physical contact with danger directly stimulates the
nociceptive, tactile and proprioceptive receptors of PAG (Keay &
Bandler, 2001, 2002).
Learning corresponds to changing synaptic strength. A Hebbian
form of learning characterises acquisition of state-action-outcome
contingencies and is linked to glutammatergic and gabaergic neu-
ral mechanisms (Izquierdo & McGaugh, 2000). A central role in
value learning is attributed to dopamine based on evidence that
response of this neurotransmitter reflects a reinforcer prediction
error signal, both in instrumental (Berridge, 2007; Hollerman &
Schultz, 1998) and Pavlovian contexts (Schultz, Dayan, &
Montague, 1997; Wenzel, Rauscher, Cheer, & Oleson, 2014). A
key role has been proposed also for serotonin whose function
would be opponent to dopamine, though evidence is mixed
(Boureau & Dayan, 2011). Serotonin has also been linked to con-
trollability and specifically to activity in DRN, a major serotoniner-
gic hub in the brain (Maier & Watkins, 2005). A possibility is that
this neurotransmitter is involved in learning a general form of con-
trollability, which is independent of the current context. This
might suggest that the opponency between dopamine and sero-
tonin might be only partial, being the former linked with learning
values attached to specific contexts and the latter linked with
learning a controllability belief independent of contexts. This
hypothesis remains to be tested in future research.5. Discussion
We propose a computational model of aversion based on a goal-
directed/Pavlovian interaction wherein controllability and threat
distance occupy an important modulatory role by influencing the
relative strength of the two controllers. The integration of multi-
faceted motivational mechanisms is an important aspect of this
proposal given that most previous theories have considered only
partial components of aversion. Indeed, associative-learning mod-
els have largely focused on reactive Pavlovian behaviour
(Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989; Deakin & Graeff, 1991; Dinsmoor,
2001; Fanselow, 1994; Fanselow & Lester, 1988; Graeff, 2004;
McNaughton & Corr, 2004), whereas most normative decision-
making theories implicitly assume goal-directed control alone
(Glimcher, 2004; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979).
Our model is inspired by recent proposals that view behaviour
as guided by a multicontroller system that integrates instrumental
and Pavlovian components (Dayan et al., 2006; Guitart-Masip et al.,
2014; Moutoussis et al., 2008; Rigoli et al., 2012). We also stress
the link with a set of neural network models that combine rein-
forcement learning principles within a biologically plausible
implementation. This permits us to connect model architectures
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(Frank, Seeberger, & O’Reilly, 2004; Miller & Cohen, 2001;
Reynolds & O’Reilly, 2009).
Though debate remains regarding the precise mechanisms
underlying the Pavlovian/goal-directed interactions, we assume
these systems work in parallel as each performs its specific compu-
tations at the same time as the other. An alternative possibility is
that a meta-decision process allocates resources to one or the other
controller before they perform their specific computations. Future
research is needed to elucidate this point.
There is strong evidence that the two systems interact at differ-
ent levels. Here we focus on competition at the motor level based
on evidence that (i) Pavlovian stimuli can inhibit a general motor
reactivity (Gray, 1987; Gray & McNaughton, 2000), (ii) non-
specific Pavlovian responses such as trembling can impair the pre-
cision of motor commands (Rigoli et al., 2012) (iii) specific Pavlo-
vian motor actions can influence the execution of incompatible
instrumental behaviour (Morse, Mead, & Kelleher, 1967). Other
levels are involved in the goal-directed/Pavlovian interaction as
fearful stimuli can exert a Pavlovian influence on executive func-
tions usually associated with goal-directed control, for instance
by speeding and biasing attentional processes (Eysenck,
Derakshan, Santos, & Calvo, 2007). Another set of interaction
effects occurs at the level of value computation, as in Pavlovian–in-
strumental transfer (PIT) and conditioned suppression where a
Pavlovian stimulus increases (or decreases) the motivation to
approach (or avoid) other appetitive (or aversive) outcomes espe-
cially those also predicted by the same Pavlovian stimulus as in
specific PIT (Bray, Rangel, Shimojo, Balleine, & O’Doherty, 2008;
Campese, McCue, Lázaro-Muñoz, LeDoux, & Cain, 2013; Campese
et al., 2014; Dickinson & Pearce, 1977; Holland, 2004; Overmier,
Bull, et al., 1971; Rescorla & Solomon, 1967).
Here we focus on goal-directed–Pavlovian interactions, though
models of instrumental control include also the so-called habitual
system, which is based on stimulus–response associations learned
through the history of reinforcement (Adams, 1982; Colwill &
Rescorla, 1988; Daw, Niv, & Dayan, 2005) and is thought to over-
whelm goal-directed control in simple environments and after
extensive training (Dolan & Dayan, 2013). It is important to stress
that, despite some notable exceptions (e.g., Holland, 2004; Rigoli
et al., 2012), most of the data available on aversion do not distin-
guish between goal-directed and habitual control. Future research
is needed to clarify whether the influence of the Pavlovian system
changes with goal-directed compared to habitual control, though
we note that some empirical evidence suggests Pavlovian effects
might even be enhanced in the latter case (Holland, 2004; Rigoli
et al., 2012).
In keeping with a large body of empirical evidence, in our model
a key role is attributed to threat distance and controllability. The
importance of threat distance has been stressed in previous mod-
els, but here we extend this idea by arguing this variable not only
influences which defensive reaction is exhibited but also which
form of control, Pavlovian or goal-directed, is activated. Specifi-
cally, our model proposes that the Pavlovian strength is boosted
as threat distance decreases. A similar point is proposed with
respect to controllability together with the distinction of different
hierarchical levels that represent this variable, including
contextual-dependent and contextual-independent components.
The inclusion of two components that are organised hierarchically
can account for different empirical phenomena, reconciling com-
peting theories on the role controllability (Maier & Seligman,
1976; Mineka et al., 1984; Seligman &Maier, 1967). Indeed a speci-
fic controllability factor can account for a finding that fear
responses increase with uncontrollable, compared to controllable,
punishments (Desiderato & Newman, 1971; Mineka et al., 1984).
A general controllability factor accounts for evidence that uncon-trollability effects are generalised to new contexts by impairing
instrumental learning (Maier & Seligman, 1976; Seligman &
Maier, 1967).
Fear and anxiety are emotional responses favoured by evolution
for their efficacy in dealing with danger. An influential perspective
suggests that these are two separate emotions as controlled by
specific psychological and neural systems and triggered by specific
aversive conditions, with threat distance determining which of the
two is activated (Blanchard & Blanchard, 1989; Davis, Walker,
Miles, & Grillon, 2009; Deakin & Graeff, 1991; Fanselow, 1994;
Fanselow & Lester, 1988; Graeff, 2004; LeDoux & Gorman, 2014;
McNaughton & Corr, 2004). Specifically, fear would correspond to
a set of fight/flight reactions elicited by proximal and certain
threats, whereas anxiety would be characterised by more complex
processes such as worrying tendencies elicited by distal and uncer-
tain threats. In our scheme, fear and anxiety are viewed as parts of
a continuum which describes the goal-directed/Pavlovian relative
weight, with controllability and threat distance determining the
current position within the continuum. One extreme of the contin-
uum corresponds to a state of mild anxiety, characterised by the
belief that the threat is still far and controllable. Here, goal-
directed planning prevails and the influence of Pavlovian beha-
viour is negligible. As one moves towards the other extreme, the
perception of threat distance and controllability decreases, anxiety
enhances, and the Pavlovian influence emerges. In this condition of
increased anxiety, goal-directed planning is still important but
Pavlovian reactions, such as an automatic attention towards threat
and an increased physiological response (Eysenck et al., 2007), are
also manifested. Note that such state of elevated anxiety is charac-
terised by an intermediate level of controllability and threat dis-
tance. As we approach the other extreme of the continuum,
controllability and threat distance diminish, goal-directed control
is disrupted and fight/flight/freezing Pavlovian reactions dominate,
a condition associated to fear. Note that, in this view, fear and anx-
iety are not qualitatively different emotions like in some other the-
ories (Davis et al., 2009; Deakin & Graeff, 1991; Fanselow, 1994;
Fanselow & Lester, 1988; McNaughton & Corr, 2004), but share
common Pavlovian processes (though there might be aspects of
the Pavlovian response which might be activated only during fear
and not anxiety and vice versa). In addition, the transition from
anxiety to fear is graded. This perspective suggests that one of
the key factors of pathological anxiety might be a bias towards per-
ceiving decreased threat distance and controllability. This would
lead to an exaggerated anxiety response despite the true levels of
controllability and threat distance are high, and to a fear response
in conditions where an anxious response would be appropriate.
Our view can be conceived as a formalisation and extension of a
previous influential theory which proposes that the key dysfunc-
tion in exaggerated anxiety is an increased anxiety response with
distal threats but not proximal threats (Mathews & Mackintosh,
1998).
Our model is based on some arbitrary assumptions and simpli-
fications. One of these is that goal-directed planning follows a
serial process by which different actions are simulated sequen-
tially. This might be too simplistic, though the idea that executive
functions require serial computations is supported by some data
(Miller & Cohen, 2001). Other assumptions are about the choice
process, as we assume that even after extensive training an agent
exhibits randomness in choice due to a softmax decision rule, again
based on empirical support (Daw, O’Doherty, Dayan, Seymour, &
Dolan, 2006). A further simplification is in the use of a fixed learn-
ing rate, at variance with evidence that this parameter depends on
uncertainty or environmental volatility (Behrens, Woolrich,
Walton, & Rushworth, 2007; Pezzulo et al., 2013). One possibility
is that uncertainty about the values encoded by the goal-directed
and Pavlovian control might also modulate the relative strength
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2015; Pezzulo et al., 2013). The Pavlovian subsystem is imple-
mented as a set of stimulus–response associations learned through
punishment experience, though this is likely to be an oversimplifi-
cation given evidence that Pavlovian responses are also elicited by
stimulus-outcome associations (Dickinson & Balleine, 2002). How-
ever, it is unclear in which circumstances Pavlovian mechanisms
are under the control of stimulus–response and stimulus-
outcome associations and how these different representations
interact.
Our model can deal with problems having multi-steps temporal
horizons, though these scenarios are not considered in our simula-
tions. A limit of the model is that it works with simple problems
with a small state space and with relatively short temporal hori-
zons. A fundamental issue arising from problems with large state
space is that computing the optimal policy becomes computation-
ally expensive or intractable, and, to account for this, approxima-
tions such as sampling methods are often adopted (Pezzulo et al.,
2013). A way to implement these approximations in our model
could be to set an order for policy/action simulation during goal-
directed planning, implemented through the pattern of inhibitory
connections among policy/action nodes.6. Conclusions
We propose a computational model of aversion that takes into
account different kinds of computations and their complex interac-
tion and integrate them in a broad and unifying picture. We believe
this might provide a useful reference for empirical research as can
help generate new hypotheses and guide the setting of priorities
on research questions. Moreover, given the ubiquity and relevance
of aversive conditions in everyday contexts, the model can help a
better understanding of important aspects in clinical and interven-
tion settings, and here we provide an example in relation with neg-
ative emotions.
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In this section, the algorithm implemented by the model is
described in detail. The model is composed of layers grouped in
different subsystems. The first subsystem is the goal-directed con-
troller, composed by ACT, OUT, GDV, WM, and GDP. For implemen-
tations involving multi-step horizons, ACT, OUT and GDV are
replicated for each time step and POL and GDV-SUM are included.
Each ACT (step function) neuron corresponds to a simulated
action; Each OUT (linear function) neuron corresponds to an
expected outcome; GDV has only a (linear function) neuron, which
corresponds to the value of the currently simulated action; WM
encodes the memorised action values, and has the same number
of neurons as ACT (although, in this case, they are linear function
neurons); GDP encodes the selected action, having the same num-
ber of (linear function) neurons as WM. In multi-steps horizon
problems, POL contains as many (step function) nodes as the num-ber of combinations of node activations within the different ACTs
along time and GDV-SUM includes a (linear function) neuron.
For one-step temporal horizon implementations, the dynamic
of the goal-directed subsystem is as follows. At the beginning of
each trial, all neurons have a null activation. A stimulus i is
detected in the environment activating the corresponding PERC(i)
neuron which sends an output signal equal to one to all ACT nodes.
ACT nodes are step function neurons whose activity is equal to zero
if the corresponding input is equal or smaller than zero, and equal
to one if the corresponding input is larger than zero. Each ACT neu-
ron sends an inhibitory output equal to minus one to all other neu-
rons in ACT with a larger index. For this reason, although PERC(i)
excites all ACT neurons, only the first one is activated, while all
other neurons are inhibited by the first one. PERC–ACT–OUT con-
nections are represented by a weight matrix M(I, J,Z), where I, J
and Z are the number of nodes in PERC, ACT and OUT, respectively.
When the first ACT neuron is activated, an ACT–PERC combination
(i,1) activates the vector OUT(:) = M(i,1, :)/sum(M(i,1, :)). The OUT
vector is multiplied by the OUT–GDV connection vector, and the
result is the scalar activation of the GDV neuron. The GDV value
is then multiplied by the ACT vector, and the resulting vector sums
up to the initial WM zero vector. After this process, the first neuron
of WM has an activation which is equal to the GDV value, while all
other neurons continue to have a null activation. At this point, the
goal-directed process continues in a recursive way. Indeed, WM
has an inhibitory connection with ACT. In particular, the xth WM
neuron sends an output to the xth ACT neuron, so as, if WM(x)
> 0, then ACT(x) = 0. Since after the first cycle WM(1) > 0, then
ACT(1) neuron is inhibited by WM(1). For this reason, now the sec-
ond neuron in ACT is no more inhibited by the first one (which is
now inhibited by WM). At the same time, all other neurons are
inhibited by the second ACT neuron. At this point, the computa-
tions are repeated as described before, until all ACT neurons have
been activated. At the beginning of every cycle, all neural activa-
tions decay, except those related to PERC and WM. In relation to
the latter layer, every time the resulting vector of the multiplica-
tion between GDV and ACT is computed, it sums up to theWM vec-
tor of the previous cycle, and the resulting vector is the new WM
vector. Once all WM neurons, which represent the action values,
have been computed, one of the GDP neurons is activated. The
index of this neuron is extracted from a distribution whose ele-
ments have a probability equal to the corresponding normalised
action values. The activation level of the GDP neuron corresponds
to the activation of the highest activation neuron in WM, even
when the latter neuron and the activated GDP neuron have a differ-
ent index.
For multi-steps horizon implementations, the i input recruits
the PERC(i) neuron which sends an output signal equal to one to
all POL nodes which are step function neurons whose activity is
equal to zero if the corresponding input is equal or smaller than
zero, and equal to one if the corresponding input is larger than
zero. Each POL neuron sends an inhibitory output equal to minus
one to all other neurons in POL with a larger index. For this reason,
although PERC(i) excites all POL neurons, only the first one is acti-
vated, while all other neurons are inhibited by the first one. An
activation of the first POL node induces activity in a certain combi-
nation of nodes within the different ACT layers along time. The
active node j1 of the first (in temporal order) ACT and of the active
node i of PERC activate the node vector of the first OUT(:) = M(i,
j1, :)/sum(M(i, j1, :)). The first OUT vector is multiplied by the
OUT–GDV connection vector, and the result is the scalar activation
of the first GDV. Next, the active node j2 of the second ACT and the
vector of the first OUT activate the vector of the second OUT in
which activity of each node corresponds to OUT(z2) = sum(M(:, j2,
z2)/sum(M(:, j1, :)). The vector of the second OUT is multiplied by
the OUT–GDV connection vector, and the result is the scalar
424 F. Rigoli et al. / Cognition 146 (2016) 415–425activation of the second GDV. This process is repeated along time
until the last GDV is computed and all GDVs are summed up in
GDV-SUM (at this stage it is possible to implement temporal dis-
counting by multiplying each GDV by a corresponding discounting
factor), which is next recorded in WM. After the first POL node is
evaluated, planning follows the same dynamic as that described
above for the one-step horizon implementation involving WM
and ACT, except that now POL plays the role of ACT. Similarly, each
time a new POL node is activated, the policy evaluation process fol-
lows the process described above for the one-step horizon
implementation.
The second subsystem is the Pavlovian controller, whose layers
are PV and PR. The former is composed of a (linear function) neu-
ron, whose activity depends on PERC vector multiplied by the
PERC–PV connection vector. PR is composed of the same number
of neurons as ACT, but in this case neurons are linear function ones.
Their activation corresponds to the product of PV and the PV–PR
connection vector. All PV–PR vector neurons have value equal to
zero except the one corresponding to the innate reaction with a
value of one. The third subsystem is related to modulator variables
including SC, GC and TSTD each represented by a linear function
neuron.
Once GDP, PR, SC, GC and TSTD have been computed, the IA
neuron activation is calculated. IA neuron is a sigmoid function
neuron whose value is computed as follows:IA¼ 1
1þexpð0:1ðb0þbGDPGDPðsÞþbPRPRþbSCSCþbGCGCþbTSDTSTDwhere GDP(s) corresponds to the active GDP neuron, PR corre-
sponds to the PR neuron associated with the Pavlovian innate reac-
tion, and b parameters represent weights. Finally, BEHAVIOUR
depends on which number is extracted from a binomial distribution
whose parameter is IA. If the extracted number is 1, then BEHA-
VIOUR = GDP(s). If the extracted number is zero, BEHAVIOUR
depends on PR(s). When PR(s) < 0, then BEHAVIOUR = PR(s); when
PR(s) = 0, then BEHAVIOUR corresponds to a random action.
Once an outcome (OUTCOME) associated with a scalar hedonic
value V 6 0 is collected, M (i.e., the PERC–ACT–OUT connection
matrix), is updated by a learning rate (aM1) added to the weight
M(STIMULUS,OUTCOME,BEHAVIOUR). The OUT–GDV(OUTCOME)
and PERC–PV(STIMULUS) connection weights and the GC value
are updated according to a delta rule by summing a prediction
error multiplied by a learning rate (respectively aGDV, aPV and
aGC) to the previous value. The prediction error depends on V both
for the OUT–GDV(OUTCOME) weight and the PERC–PV(STIMULUS)
weight, and on SC for GC.
For the simulations, initial weights of the M matrix are set to
one and other weights to zero. Initial GC value is set to one and
the temperature parameter of the softmax function used to chooseTable 1
Parameters used in the simulations.
Parameter Sim. 1 Sim. 2 Sim. 3 Sim. 4 Sim. 5
b0 80 80 80 120 80
bGDP 30 30 30 30 30
bPR 0 100 100 100 100
bSC 0 0 200 200 0
bGC 0 0 0 200 0
bTSD 0 0 0 0 1
aM1 1 1 1 1 1
aGDV 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
aPV 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
aGC 0 0 0 0.0002 0
n. of trials 1200 1200 1200 1000/7500 1200the action in GDP is assigned a value of one. Parameter values used
in the simulations are reported in Table 1.
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